Double Auctions

Market trade is full of strategy. Buyers have to know the real costs of the sellers in order to push the price down. Sellers have to know the real valuations of the buyers in order to pull the price up.

The research on double auctions aims to make trade easier and more peaceful by creating truthful mechanisms - creating rules of trade in which each buyer and each seller are best-off when acting according to their true valuations without any strategic considerations. You should not need to spy over the other agents in order to know what their valuations are.

Publications and working papers

  1. "SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2016, pages 260-272. Full version (14 pages). → Presentation
  2. "Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      Operations Research Letters 2016, pages 757-760.     Full version
  3. "MUDA: a Truthful Multi Unit Double Auction Mechanism ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      AAAI 2018 and arXiv 2018. → Presentation
  4. "Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim.      Working paper
  5. "Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      IJCAI 2018 and arXiv 2018. → Presentation
  6. "Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent (aka Making an Appraiser Work for You) ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, Tomer Sharbaf and David Sarne.      Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2020, 34(2):1–25. Preliminary versions: AAMAS 2019 and arXiv 2019.
  7. "A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism ": Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi.      AAMAS 2021, pages 1515–1516 (extended abstract).
  8. "Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets ": Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi.      Artificial Intelligence 2021. Previous versions: AAAI 2020 and arXiv 2019.