Double Auctions

Market trade is full of strategy. Buyers have to know the real costs of the sellers in order to push the price down. Sellers have to know the real valuations of the buyers in order to pull the price up.

The research on double auctions aims to make trade easier and more peaceful by creating truthful mechanisms - creating rules of trade in which each buyer and each seller are best-off when acting according to their true valuations without any strategic considerations. You should not need to spy over the other agents in order to know what their valuations are.

Publications and working papers

  1. "SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2016, pages 260-272. “Simple but cute” (–an anonymous reviewer). Full version (14 pages). → Presentation
  2. "Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      Operations Research Letters, 2016, pages 757-760.     Full version
  3. "MUDA: a Truthful Multi Unit Double Auction Mechanism ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      AAAI 2018 and arXiv 2018. → Presentation
  4. "Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim.      Working paper
  5. "Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information (aka Making an Appraiser Work for You) ": 2. Shani Alkobi, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi and Tomer Sharbaf.      AAMAS 2018 (extended abstract) and arXiv 2018.
  6. "Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods ": Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann.      IJCAI 2018 and arXiv 2018. → Presentation